Abstract-Abu
I.
DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUP: SYNOPSIS The Health Authority of Abu Dhabi (HAAD) legalized all characteristics of health insurance in late 2010, including all issues related to payment and compensation. Such mandates stipulated for the adoption of DRGs for reimbursement of inpatient services for the essential product. The Abu Dhabi government-subsidized insurance product for low-earning citizens including the claims from health sectors including all hospitals, public or private. Abu Dhabi Health Services commonly referred to as SEHA (phonetic rendering Arabic word for 'health'), the holding company for the public hospitals Abu Dhabi has already chosen DRGs on a voluntary basis for all of their inpatient cases and the providers. According to HAAD, the introduction of DRGs was to deliver on its commitment to improving efficiency incentives for providers to support for better comparability of both costs and quality as well as to appropriately reimburse public hospitals for their higher complexity of cases (Warner et al., 2011) . Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) are just one type of payment methods for the hospital where it gained its popularity after their adoption to be used in the national Medicare prospective payment system in late 1983 in the United State of America (Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1983). The fundamental conception of DRGs is based on the averages. The providers of healthcare are paid based on nature and severity of illness not length of hospitalization or number of procedures for a lab test that has been ordered or medication has been dispensed or administered to the patients (Hamidi et al., 2015) .
II.
HISTORY OF DRG Medicare was established in 1965; Congress approved the private health insurance sector's "retrospective cost-based reimbursement" scheme as a payment method for hospital services. Where Medicare made periodic payments to hospitals during the hospital's fiscal year. The hospital expected to file a cost report by the end of fiscal year and the interim payments to be agreed with the allowable costs that were mentioned in the policy and regulation. Medicare's hospital costs under this payment system amplified dramatically; between 1967 and 1983, costs increased from $3 billion to $37 billion yearly (Mihailovic et al., 2016) . In 1982, Congress ordered the construction of a prospective payment system (PPS) to control costs. Congress studied the achievement of State rate regulation systems in costs controlling and mandated the application of a prospective payment system framework that had been fruitful in several States. This system is a per-case reimbursement technique under which inpatient admission cases are alienated into relatively similar categories named diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). In DRG prospective payment scheme, Medicare pays hospitals a flat amount per claim for inpatient hospital care so that effective and efficient hospitals have a real incentive of being efficient and inefficient hospitals are motivated to become better organized and to improve their efficiency (Mihailovic et al., 2016) . Although DRGs development started in the late 1960's the first version to be largely spread was consist of 383 categories after that in early 1982 second revised set of 467 categories was released. Both versions were designed to distinguish patients with comparable predicted resource utilized for management and to link it to the hospitalization period or length of stay in the hospital during that admission. The former version was developed by New Jersey hospital using data of around 500,000 patients but the revised version based on the nationally representative sample of patients (United States Congress., Office of Technology Assessment, 1983). (Hamidi et al., 2015) . Abu Dhabi succeeded to separate the healthcare regulator Health Authority Abu-Dhabi (HAAD) to be responsible for policy development and to formulate regulatory requirements for the healthcare professional, providers and payers in addition to that HAAD monitor the compliance with requirements and to take the necessary action to enforce compliance (Hamidi et al., 2015) . In late 2010, HAAD replaced the fee for service payment framework with new prospective payment method called diagnosis-related groups to become mandatory for reimbursement of all inpatients visits in public and private hospitals (Hamidi, et al., 2015) . DRG and another type of provider payment schemes According to WHO, there are several methods to pay for the healthcare providers used for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members, but the most common approach is salaries, the fee for service payments (FFS), diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), per-diem payments or capitation and Budget (Park et al., 2007) , 'What is the difference between these methods and what are their advantages and disadvantages?' Salary-based System Most OECD countries either pay salaries for doctors partially or complete payment methods. Under this payment method, the income of the physician is not linked to the output and quality of services or quantity of items that are associated with low motivation, low quality of service and low productivity. However, such method can be combined with other methods like capitation to increase motivation as well as to improve productivity and quality of service. The cost containment considered high in salaries framework method (Park et al., 2007) The salary-based system used in many countries in Europe and elsewhere for a wage of healthcare employees. For example, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and Turkey (Chawla et al., 1997) . According to Chawla et al., salary based remuneration scheme almost has no financial incentives for physicians to work longer hours or looking after more patients also they do not provide an incentive to reduce operating costs. Physicians also have no incentive to build the proper relationship with the patients (Chawla et al., 1997).
III. ABU DHABI HEALTH AND THE DRGS SYSTEM

Fee-for-service (FFS)
The number of services provided is the main factor in determining the amount to be paid to the providers, which are considered strong incentive to provide more service especially the valuable items even more than it is required. FFS is considered the weak tool for cost containment also doctors who are using FFS framework try to undertake more efforts to deliver a higher quality of healthcare services so that they attract more patients (Park et al., 2007) . Germany combined FFS with sectoral budgets as a cost containment policy (Park et al., 2007) . Some examples of countries follow a fee-for-service scheme for compensation of healthcare providers. Include: Germany (private physicians and dentists), Czech Republic, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Holland (private sector), Bulgaria (private sector), Ireland (private sector), Greece (private sector), Turkey (private sector) and Slovenia (private sector) (Chawla et al., 1997) . Such payment method gives the provider incentives to increase the volume of services, which result into overuse, an oversupply of services (Chawla et al., 1997) . According to Averill et al., the fee for service does not incentivize primary care physicians to act as a financially prudent gatekeeper, that is, they will not be rewarded in case they spend more time with the patient to avoid unnecessary hospital admission (Averill et al., 2010) .
Case-Based Reimbursement System
The (DRG)-system is a patient classification system established to categorize patients into clusters economically and medically comparable, expected to have similar hospital resource use and expenses. Based on the final diagnosis for the admitted patient the providers will be reimbursed at prospective fixed rate per discharged according to the diagnosis. DRG framework considered suitable instrument for cost control providers is inspired to deliver services as cost-effective as possible with the minimum possible duration of stay in the hospital. On the other side, DRG system has a potential risk about premature discharges, in addition to; the provider may select the patients with low-cost (Park et al., 2007) . Some examples of countries follow a case-based system for Figure 1 shows the risk of different payment methods on payer and provider according to Averill et al., 2010.
Fig.1: Payment bundling continuum (Source: Averill et al., 2010) Capitation
A fixed amount of money is paid to the providers based on the number of patients to deliver a variety of services. Under this scheme, the providers get a fee for each enrollment to cover a defined package of services for a certain period (Chawla et al., 1997) . Some countries in Europe and elsewhere apply a capitation-based scheme for the payoff of healthcare providers. Some example includes Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Holland, and Croatia (private sector). In capitation, physicians have a strong incentive to select healthy individuals who require less visit and less cost. Physicians have strong incentive to avoid expensive treatment and refer patients to higher level of care to save own operating costs (Chawla et al., 1997) .
Per Diem
In this framework, the providers are paid per day of admission, which gives a strong incentive for the hospital to increase the length of admissions. The length of stay in hospital in Japan is the longest globally this could be attributed to this type of payment method (Muramatsu 1999) . Germany introduced DRGs as payments method due to the excessively high length of stay under the per diem scheme (Park et al., 2007) . In summary, each of the above payment methods for the healthcare provider carries a risk for both provider and payer but with different degree. DRGs payment system has balance risk as illustrated in Table 1 . 
In-depth interviews
The payment method before the introduction of DRG was Fee for Service Payment system was enforced either through a standard provider contract or individually customized contract basis for non-Abu Dhabi providers in Dubai and the North Emirates. Abu Dhabi Healthcare system introduced DRGs to stabilize the increasing healthcare costs across the sectors. In addition to that DRGs expected to increase transparency between hospitals as DRGs will simplify costs and quality comparisons between hospitals. The insurance companies will no longer review each service performed by the hospital rather they will pay as a total predetermined payment based on the average. There are different modalities of DRG, but the one that was adopted by Abu Dhabi government International refined DRGS (IR-DGRs) as it is dynamic and can be modified and customized based on the healthcare system and the local requirement. Emirate of Abu Dhabi selects to use the sixth digital code where the first two digits indicate major disease category (MDC) while the third digit indicates the DRG type whether surgical or medical the fourth and the fifth digits indicate DRG number the last digit indicates the severity level, which consists of three levels. DRG was implemented to the Sheikh Khalifa Medical City (SKMC) in 2011 after DRG Assurance training conducted by 3M in this system providers share some of the financial risks with the payers. DRG system is efficient, but there is a high incentive for the vendor for early discharge of patient quicker and sicker which may lead to readmission, but in SKMC they noticed neither increase in mortality nor the readmission rate after applying this payment method. DRGs appears to help in enhancing the quality of inpatient care by discouraging unnecessary and potentially harmful systems, and by encouraging the concentration of complex procedures in facilities in which the high frequency of these procedures promotes efficiency. According to HAAD officials, the implementation of the comprehensive insurance system in Emirate of Abu Dhabi helped to facilitate the DRG introduction, but the price applied in USA not suitable for UAE market for this reason HAAD evaluated the cost of DRG based on the data collected from the claim of all hospitals in Abu Dhabi. Either the most important factor that pushes HAAD to adopt DRG system is the high rejection rate entirely or partially in addition to overuse of Fee for Service Payment method which results in unnecessary procedures. DRG is also helpful for planning as it shows which area need to add hospital or which specialty has a shortage in addition to that DRGs allow to compare between hospital performance based on severity level. The HAAD has signed an agreement with Emirates Classification Society (TASNEEF) to Certify Healthcare Providers in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi for JAWDA Data Certification. If DRGs is not monitored, it may lead to early discharged which result in readmission within the same month for this reason HAAD may introduce a quality program called JAWDA (Tasneef, 2016) for example, if the same patient readmitted within one month the first provider will be questioned.
User Experience Questionnaire
The authors measured the DRGs system end user evaluation experience-using questionnaire validated to be 2) Perspicuity: Is it obvious to get familiar with the product? Is it easy to learn how to use the product?
3) Efficiency: Can users solve their tasks without unnecessary effort? 4) Dependability: Does the user feel in control of the interaction? 5) Stimulation: Is it inspiring and motivating to use the product?
6)
Novelty: Is the product innovative and creative? Does the product catch the interest of users? UEQ have been used in different studies to evaluate user experience, but this is the first time to use UEQ to evaluate DRGs user experience using 3M system (Schrepp et al., 2014) . Table 2 shows the mean of the 26 items of UEQ values above 0.8 represent positive evaluation, Values between -0.8 and 0.8 represent a neutral assessment of the corresponding scale and < -0,8 represent a negative evaluation. We can notice that most of the means above 0.8 that reflect positive evaluation for 3M system used by the coder for DRGs coding the exceptions are item 4 and 13, which represent neutral evaluation. Figure 1 represent the means of the six scales: attractiveness which represented by items (1,12, 14, 16 , 24, 25.) with mean of 1.793, perspicuity which represented by items (2,4, 13, 21) with mean of 1.2, efficiency which represented by items (9,20, 22, 23.) with mean of 1.64 , dependability which represented by items (8, 11, 17, 19 .) with mean of 1.56 , stimulation which represented by items (5, 6, 7, 18 .) with mean of 1.84 and novelty which represented by items novelty (3,10, 15, 26) with mean of 1.35, whereof the means above 0.8 which represent positive evaluation of the DRG system. Table 4 and Figure 2 represent the means of pragmatic quality which include (perspicuity, efficiency, dependability) with an overall mean of 1.47, the hedonic quality which includes (stimulation and novelty) with an overall mean of 1.60 and attractive with the mean of 1.79. Which again represent positive evaluation, which is above 0.8. Tables 5 and 6 show the 5% confidence intervals for the scale means and the means of the single items the lesser the confidence interval, the higher is the precision of the estimation and the more the results can be trusted. The smaller confidence interval also reflects the more consistency of the person's opinion. Table 7 shows the correlations of the items per scale and Cronbach's Alpha-Coefficient which is a measure of the consistency of a scale. In general value above 0.6 reflect excepted consistency of the scale all the six scale Cronbach's4 Alpha-Coefficient above 0.6. Table 8 and figure 3 shows the scale comparison to the benchmark where three of the scale were excellent and two were good and only one was above the average which again represents positive evaluation of the coders to the DRGs system. Figure 4 shows all DRGs claims in 2013 were 61% (n=106,957) came from SEHA hospitals while 39% (n=67,136) from Non-SEHA hospitals. Figure  5 shows that SEHA and non-SEHA hospital share the surgical DRGs market by around 50% for each, but in a case of medical DRGs SEHA hospital got more than 70% of the medical related DRGs 2013 compared with less than 30% for non-SEHA hospitals. The most common surgical DRGs was childbirth followed by appendix procedures, on the other hand, most common medical DRGs are those related to a digestive system and female reproductive system. It can be noticed that the market share of the DRGs claim differs based on the system but most of the claim belong to SEHA hospital in case of the Myeloproliferative System & Poorly Differentiated Neoplasms 2013 claims 99 % from SEHA hospitals which indicate the shortage in this area in 
